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CRYPTOGRAPHY

Africa Prepares for Post-Quantum Cryptography

Africa is actively preparing its digital infrastructure for the advent of quantum computing, focusing on post-quantum cryptography to secure mobile money and critical data.

Read time
5 min read
Word count
1,123 words
Date
Jul 25, 2026
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Africa is strategically preparing for the quantum computing era, particularly focusing on post-quantum cryptography to safeguard its rapidly expanding mobile money ecosystem. With trillions of dollars moving through mobile platforms, primarily in sub-Saharan Africa, securing this financial backbone against future quantum threats is a critical concern. The Africa Quantum Consortium leads a coordinated continental effort, emphasizing shared resources and practitioner-focused guidance to address unique regional challenges in migrating to new cryptographic standards.

Africa Prepares for Post-Quantum Cryptography. Visualization by Stable Diffusion
Visualization by Stable Diffusion
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Africa is making significant strides to secure its digital infrastructure against the future threat of quantum computing, especially in safeguarding its expansive mobile money ecosystem. This proactive approach aims to protect financial transactions and sensitive data from potential decryption by powerful quantum machines. The continent recognizes the urgency of this transition, acting decisively to implement new cryptographic standards.

Over two trillion dollars circulated through mobile money platforms globally in 2025, with approximately two-thirds of this value processed within sub-Saharan Africa. For a fifth of adults in the region, a mobile money account serves as their sole financial access point. The security of these transactions relies on public-key cryptography, specifically RSA and elliptic-curve mathematics, which powerful quantum computers could compromise in the future.

The immediate threat from quantum computers has not materialized, but the risk to existing encrypted data is already present. Cryptographers identify this as the “harvest now, decrypt later” problem, where adversaries collect encrypted traffic today for decryption once quantum hardware becomes available. The White House’s June 2026 executive order on post-quantum migration cites this risk, emphasizing that federal agencies must no longer view the transition as a distant concern. Confidential data, including identity records, health information, and financial archives requiring long-term security, faces an ongoing timer.

Strategic Discussions for Digital Security

On June 26, the Africa Quantum Consortium (AQC), a pan-African organization founded by Farai Mazhandu, hosted a roundtable titled “Securing Africa’s Digital Backbone.” This pivotal session attracted registrations from over twenty countries, highlighting the widespread regional interest in quantum strategy. Attendees included Professor Çetin Kaya Koç, a leading figure in cryptographic hardware, and Michael Osborne, who has spearheaded IBM’s quantum-safe cryptography initiatives since 2018. They were joined by African bank technologists, regulators, and students, creating a diverse group committed to addressing future cybersecurity challenges.

When asked where African institutions should begin their migration, panelists consistently pointed beyond pure cryptography. Osborne noted, “There’s not enough budget in the world to make everything we have today quantum safe.” He explained that after two decades of building IBM’s cryptography practice, his current role primarily involves business problems and organizational change management. The most challenging aspect of migration, he observed, is rarely the mathematical complexity. Instead, the difficulty often stems from institutions lacking a clear understanding of where their existing cryptography resides within their systems.

Aditya Koranga, who chairs the technical advisory committee of the Post-Quantum Cryptography Alliance, echoed this sentiment. He recounted experiences from live bank migrations across Southeast Asia where, he stated, “nobody knew who to point us to.” There was no single team with a comprehensive map of the organization’s cryptographic assets. This lack of centralized oversight complicates the identification and upgrading of vulnerable systems, underscoring the need for thorough asset mapping and clear ownership.

Just four days before the roundtable, the White House issued an executive order linking post-quantum migration deadlines to federal procurement processes. This order uses purchase orders as a mechanism to ensure vendor and contractor compliance, rather than relying solely on research mandates. The African practitioners at the roundtable independently arrived at a similar conclusion due to a structural reality: much of Africa’s digital infrastructure is purchased rather than developed internally. Consequently, procurement contracts will determine the success or failure of the migration. Professor Koç cautioned against vendor-driven risks, stating, “Companies want to sell, sell, sell, and you have to be very careful, because you will get the blame for purchasing the wrong equipment.” This highlights the critical need for informed decision-making in vendor selection.

Developing Local Solutions and Frameworks

This critical insight was not confined to the roundtable discussion. The Africa Quantum Consortium has since published “Securing Africa’s Digital Backbone,” a practical guide for professionals. This document translates the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s post-quantum standards, specifically the ML-KEM and ML-DSA algorithms finalized in August 2024, into actionable guidance. It targets key African stakeholders, including central banks, mobile money operators, telecommunication companies, and digital identity authorities. The guide goes beyond simply reiterating existing NIST or GSMA recommendations. It addresses specific regional constraints, such as the limited memory capacity of older SIM cards for new post-quantum keys, the latency challenges for rural agent terminals during heavier cryptographic handshakes, and the need for new firmware for existing hardware security modules.

The strategy of creating solutions rather than solely importing them is central to the AQC’s broader vision. The consortium’s November 2025 white paper, “State of Quantum Science and Technology in Africa,” outlines a continental strategy centered on a “continental quantum commons.” This approach involves pooling resources across African nations instead of duplicating fragmented national programs. The authors contend that Africa’s relatively late entry into the quantum field can be leveraged as an advantage, allowing for coordinated development and shared infrastructure. South Africa’s national quantum initiative, SA QuTI, already coordinates multiple universities under a unified government mandate. AIMS Rwanda’s Quantum Leap Africa program trains graduate students in quantum information science, contributing to a growing pool of expertise. University hubs in Egypt, Ghana, Morocco, and Tunisia are also establishing master’s programs and research groups, further expanding regional capabilities.

The AQC’s newer coordinating body for communications and security, AQCSA, works to prevent these individual efforts from operating in isolation. It facilitates the sharing of inventory tools, training resources, and a common negotiating position before international standards bodies finalize global rules. This coordinated approach ensures that Africa can influence the development of future standards and prevent its technological development from being dictated by external entities. This unified front strengthens the continent’s position in global quantum discussions and fosters collective progress in securing its digital future.

Africa’s Broader Impact on Global Standards

This focused effort represents a significant shift. Africa, a region often perceived as a recipient of global technological standards, is actively working to help shape them. The ultimate success of this initiative will likely depend less on the work of cryptographers and more on the procurement officers and regulators highlighted during the AQC roundtable. These individuals will make critical, contract-by-contract decisions that determine whether Africa transitions into the post-quantum era on terms it helped establish. The AQC formally launched in August 2025, and this recent roundtable stands as a clear indicator of the ambitious goals and strategic direction the consortium intends to pursue.

The continent’s coordinated strategy for post-quantum security sets a precedent for other regions facing similar challenges. By emphasizing internal capacity building, resource pooling, and proactive engagement with international standards, Africa demonstrates a model for digital sovereignty. This approach ensures that its rapidly expanding digital economy remains secure and resilient against emerging threats, allowing it to maintain control over its technological destiny. The AQC’s work underscores the importance of regional collaboration in addressing complex global challenges, positioning Africa as a key player in shaping the future of cybersecurity.

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